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KEYINTOTE ADDRESS
Hon. James A. Leach'

CONGRESSMAN LEACH: Thank you Dean Feerick,
Secretary Carnell and Laurie Schaffer. Many of you do not know
Ms. Schaffer, but she is a staff member of the Banking Committee
and a graduate of Fordham Law School. I would like to briefly
recall one of my proudest moments working with Ms. Schaffer. We
had worked on a little bill for a few years, and the final draft came
out to be over 400 pages. One night we called representatives of
the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. Federal Reserve Board into a
room, each having a dozen lawyers, and for eight hours reviewed
the final text. At the end of this review, they found one
typographical error. I was very proud of that. I mentioned that to
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and he said, "One?"
I am also proud to be at a school where the Associate Dean is
Michael Martin. I don't know if any of you have taken a course
taught by Professor Martin, but you should know that he has one
of the most stellar academic backgrounds that anyone could have.
He is a fellow graduate of the Davenport High School in
Davenport, Iowa.
In any regard, it strikes me that the fundamental challenge of
Congress in financial services has been to try to come up with a
framework for our times. We like to use the analogy "bridge of the
century" or "the millennium," but basically the framework is for
our times. What happened in financial services is that the market
got well ahead of the law. So the effort has been (a) to

1. Cameron Professor of Law and former Associate Dean at Fordham
University School of Law. See generally,

http://Ilaw.fordham.eduhomejump.ihtml?pageid=165 (last visited September 13,

2000).
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catch up with the market and (b) to pass a law that could be
flexible and adapt to future developments.
Some background: in 1933 the U.S. Congress passed a law,

called the Glass-Steagall Act, which had the effect of separating
commercial and investment banking. It was passed under the
assumption that, as the Great Depression hit and many people lost

money, conflicts of interest had developed and some people on
Wall Street had advantages over the general public.' Actually,
later reviews of this assumption found it to be somewhat frail.' In
retrospect, it seems that more people were jumping out of
buildings on Wall Street than most places in America and that
Glass-Steagall was rooted more in resentment than in need.

2. The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to §§ 16, 20,
21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (partially repealed 1999).
The Act was a vestige of the Great Depression Era. It separated banking from
the securities business by, generally, preventing banks from issuing, underwriting,
selling or distributing securities, either directly or through affiliates. Helen A.
Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a
DeregulatoryAge, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 510 (1989) (providing a history of
the Glass-Steagall Act).
3. See Susan M. Golden, Symposium on Securities Market Regulation:
Probing the Limits of National Bank Powers under the Glass-Steagall Act, 36
CATI. U.L. REv. 1025 (1987) ("[The Glass-Steagall Act] was intended to restore
public confidence in banking, to ensure and maintain the economic stability of
banks by prohibiting unsound and imprudent bank investments, and to prevent
potential conflicts of interest between commercial and investment banks.");
Joseph Michael Heppt, Note, An Alternative to Throwing Stones: A Proposalfor
the Reform of Glass Steagall, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 289 ("Congress also sought
to prevent the conflicts of interest that arose when commercial bankers engaged
in securities activities.... A banker faced with a faltering securities offering that
his bank had underwritten may have advised his banking customers to purchase
the securities, thereby saving the securities offering and making a commission on
the sale as well.").
4. See Susan Sirota Gaetano, Note, An Overview of Financial Services
Reform 1988, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 793, 797-798 (1999) ("[Sjtudies show that banks
that engaged in stock market investment before the Glass-Steagall Act was
enacted were less likely to fail than those that were not involved in investment
activities.").
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Even if Glass-Steagall had a certain validity in the 1930s, the
market shifted somewhat gradually until the late 19S0s and 1990s,
when it shifted on a quantum basis almost every four or five years.
Customers came to prefer and use new and more sophisticated
products that, particularly in the banking industry, made many
traditional banks irrelevant to their customers. For example, over
a thirty-year period, traditional banks went from holding about
two-thirds of the saved dollar in America to holding about onequarter of the saved dollar in America.! Banking was truly on a
trend that might be described as "in eclipse," but even this is an
understatement.
This is a very difficult area in which to legislate in because
there are differences between and within various industrial sectors,
as well as between and within regulatory branches and levels of
government. It is also a difficult area to legislate because, in the
end, a legislative body is a public body and it is the public interest
that comes first. This concept of the public interest must be kept at
the forefront - not the concerns of any particular industrial
arrangement.
In creating financial services legislation, there were also
problems concerning timing and control. Even though the public
interest was the main concern, particularly to me as Chairman, it
was quite clear that various parts of the financial sector had virtual
vetoes over other parts.6 As the legislative process developed,
timing became an extraordinary problem.
Some particular
institutions within industrial groupings had theoretical support for
broad approaches. They were, however, very concerned that other
institutions had a "leg-up" and that these institutions would be able
to take advantage of a situation faster and more comprehensively

5. See, e.g., Finance Service Restructuring: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Banking and F. Serv., 105th Cong. 22-23 (1997) (statement of William T.
McConnell, President, Am. Bankers Assoc.) ("Under the current regulatory
regime, banks have lost traditional market share to other financial service
providers. In fact, while the assets banks hold have increased, banks' market
share of total assets has fallen steadily over the past two decades.").
6

See Dean Anason, Financial Firms Try to Tweak Reform Law to Gain

Powers, AM. BANKER, Feb. 23,2000, at 1 (stating that numerous firms sought to
use their lobbying powers to obtain a veto for new financial services legislation).
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than they could.7 So there was a great deal of concern over the

minutiae, sometimes because detail mattered, other times because
stalling appeared to be in the vested interest of one particular

company or kind of company vis-A-vis another.
The legislative approach we took was that of a three-way
street. That is, banks were given securities and insurance powers.'
Insurance companies were given banking and securities powers9
and securities companies were given banking and insurance
powers."0 The approach taken was a very competitive approach
that I believe is good for consumers and America's financial
position in the world.
From the consumer perspective, the Department of Treasury
estimates that there will be a savings of about $18 billion a year."
There will be advantages in single-shop banking or financial
servicing. There will be new privacy protections. 2 This legislation
contains the greatest privacy protections ever passed in a modernday statute. For example, there is a prohibition on disclosure of
account numbers to third-party telemarketers.'3 There is also a
7. See, e.g., Clyde Mitchell, FinancialModernization - One Year Laterl, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 19, 2001, at 3 (referring to "the 'turf warfare' among the banking,
securities and insurance industries that existed prior to [Gramm-Leach-Bliley]").
8. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, § 103(a), 113 Stat. 1338 (declaring that financial holding companies may
have the ability to "[ilnsure... against loss, harm, damage, illness, disability, or
death" and may also "[ujnderwrite, deal[ ]in, or mak[e] a market in securities").
9. Id. See generally Lisa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and
Insurance:Before and After the Gramm-Leach-BlileyAct, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 770772 (2000) (examining the possibility that insurance companies may enter into
banking in the wake of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services
Modernization Act).
10. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 103(a)
(authorizing securities firms to engage in banking and insurance functions that
they had previously been barred from).
11. FinancialServices Restructuring:Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking
and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong. 129 (1997) (statement of Robert E. Rubin, Treasury
Secretary).
12 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act §§ 501510 (regulating disclosure of nonpublic personal information by banks, insurance
companies, and securities firms); id. §§ 521-527 (regulating fraudulent access to
financial information by banks, insurance companies, and securities firms).
13. Id. § 502(d) ("A financial institution shall not disclose, other than to a
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consumer opt-out feature to prevent sale of information to third
parties 4 and there is a mandatory disclosure provision of privacy
policies of banks.'
In addition - and I throw this out to those of you who are
about to become active lawyers - there is potential liability for
lawyers here, liability that would put some lawyers in America
today behind bars for a very subtle act. In this world, where people
want information about everyone else, there is a growing use of
privatized and private investigative agencies to find information
about competitors for clients."5 One of the things that is now
almost universally done in the private investigation industry is what
is described as "pretext calling" or "pretext identity theft." This is
where an individual might call up a bank and say, "I'm Joe Smith, I

want to know what's in my bank account." Lawyers are involved
because they hire these firms. We are now making this a crime,
one that is subject to both civil and criminal penalties.1
This is something that is not of light import. We received a
great deal of testimony in the House Banking Committee on how

consumer reporting agency, an account number or similar form of access number
or access code for a credit card account, deposit account, or transaction account
of a consumer to any nonaffiliated third part for use in telemarketing, direct mail
marketing, or other marketing through electronic mail to the consumer.").
14. Id. § 502(b) (pointing out that a financial institution may not disclose
non-public information about its customers to non-affiliated third parties unless
the consumer is made aware that such disclosure may and possibly could occur
and "is given the opportunity... to direct that such information not be [so]
disclosed").
15. Id. § 503 (providing that financial institutions must provide consumers
with the institution's policies and practices on consumers privacy on a yearly
basis).
16. FinancialInformation PrivacyAct: Hearingbefore the House Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong. 73 (1993) (statement of Rep. James Leach)
[hereinafter Leach Statement] (stating before the House Banking and Financial
Services Committee that in "[r]ecent years [there has been] a proliferation of
business enterprises that specialize in the collection and dissemination of
personal financial information... who market their services to law frms...
seedng to obtain information of a public and nonpublic nature").
17. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act § 523
(mandating fines andfor imprisonment for up to five years for violation of the
legislation's pretext calling provisions).
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pervasive this kind of practice has become."9 The legal profession
must be alerted to it. One of the examples of pretext calling's
widespread use is the extraordinary amount of advertisements for
investigative services that specialize in this area that appear in
virtually all law journals and various legal publications. That is a
fair indication of how widespread it has become.
With regard to the consumer provisions - and there is always
the question of whether to go further - I stress (a) that they are
more comprehensive than people know, (b) that they will become
stronger, even without new legislation, and (c) that they are a little
wider than some industrial sectors currently understand. Let me
explain - the way the privacy provisions work is that if something is
financial in nature, such as the issue of travel services, a bank will
have the privacy provisions in its travel services subsidiary come
under the privacy protections of the new legislation. In addition,
all other travel agents in America will also come under the same
privacy provisions. Many travel agents are unaware that these
provisions apply to them.
In addition, the new legislation has a provision that is designed
to be more flexible in order to remain relevant in the future
financial world. For example, under the old Bank Holding
Company Act, 9 a bank could do things that were "banking in
nature," largely as adjudicated or assessed by the Comptroller,"°
1& See Leach Statement, supranote 16.
19. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133
(1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850). The Bank Holding
Company Act originally sought to close a loophole present in the Glass-Steagall
Act. Before the adoption of the Bank Holding Company Act, Glass-Steagall was
easily circumvented via the creation of bank holding companies, which then
engaged in both commercial and investment banking activities. The Bank
Holding Company Act, in essence, prevented bank holding companies from
engaging in activities that banks were prohibited from undertaking. See generally
Note, National Banks and the Brokerage Business: The Comptroller's New

Reading of the Glass-SteagallAct, 69 VA. L. REV. 1303, 1310 (1983); Susan Sirota
Gaetano, Note and Commentary, An Overview of Financial Services Reform
1998, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 793, 797-813 (1998) (discussing and providing a history of
financial services reform proposals, including reform of the Bank Holding

Company Act).
20. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the "OCC"). The OCC is an
independent bureau of the Department of the Treasury. It charters, regulates,
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but also potentially by the Federal Reserve Board. Under the new
law," banks can do things that are "financial in nature," and that is
a broader definition than "banking in nature." As each of these
new functions that might be described as "financial in nature"
comes into being, they come under the privacy protections of the
law - and so does the whole private sector that might be involved
in it. Here is an exaggerated example: if the Federal Reserve
Board declared that funeral services were financial in nature, that
would mean that any funeral services information that a bank
would have would come under the privacy protections. But, in
addition, the entire American funeral services industry would be
brought under the privacy protections of the Act.' So these
provisions get broader with time, rather than narrower.
In terms of being good for America's competitiveness in the
world, one of the interesting aspects of American finance in the
three areas of securities, commercial banking, and insurance is that
around the world various companies have different beachheads. In
one country, Citigroup might be very important. In another
country, Prudential Insurance might be important, and in another
country, Goldman Sachs might be important. By allowing each of
these American companies to offer a wider variety of products, I
think we are going to see America's position in financial services
become much stronger. This is important because some of our
European competitors have broader rights; but it is also important
in and of itself.
Here I would like to mention, with some concern, what the

and supervises all national banks. The OCC also supervises the federal branches

and agencies of foreign banks and serves as one of the directors of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). See
http:llwww.occ.treas.govlAboutOCChtm (last visited Oct. 20,2000).

21. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Fmancial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
22. See id. § 509; see also Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 N.C. BANNING INST. 1, 27 ("Because extending
credit is a financial activity described in Section 4(k) [of the Bank Holding
Company Act], a retailer that provides open-end credit accounts or sales finance
to its customers vil be a 'financial institution' and subject to the privacy
provisions in Title V.").
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bill does not do. While it opens up the financial industry to all
kinds of new competition, it forestalls the formal mixing of
commerce and banking. Indeed, it closes the one loophole in the
current law, which is called the "unitary thrift loophole." ' Let me
stress this distinction and what the law does and does not do.
The aim of this law is to have terrific open-ended competition
within financial services. It also looks, however, towards making
financial services into an independent area of American commerce.
For example, you can have a unity, as you see in the Citigroup
model, of an insurance company, a securities firm, and a banking
firm. You cannot, however, have, under this law, Citigroup
merging with General Motors or with Wal-Mart.
We have some history in this country of a merging of
commerce and banking, particularly in the 19th century.' We also
have more modem-day mergers of commerce and banking around
the world, especially in parts of Europe, and certainly in Japan.26
The United States does not allow these types of mergers, however,
partly because of the social safety net included with deposit
insurance.' If you applied deposit insurance to banks, which surely
23. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
24. See id § 401; see also Polking & Cammarn, supra note 22, at 26 (stating
that from the view of these two authors that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial
Services Modernization Act "prohibits the formation of unitary thrift holding
companies").
25. E.g., James A. Leach, Introduction: Modernization of Financial
Institutions,25 IOwA J.CORP. L. 681, 687 (2000).
26 See Financial Services Modernization Act: Hearing before the House
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of David H.
Komansky, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Merrill Lynch & Co., also
called Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith, Co.) ("Europe has long allowed
its financial houses to offer banking, securities, and insurance services. And even
Japan reformed its version of Glass-Steagall.").
27. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(B) (2000) (limiting FDIC protection to
$100,000). See generally Mark E. Van Der Weide and Satish M. Kini,
Subordinated Debt: A CapitalMarkets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L.
REV. 195, 204 (2000) [hereinafter Weide & Kini] (identifying and explaining that
there are three main elements of the banking safety net, which are "(1) federal
insurance of banks' deposits for up to $100,000; (2) access for banks to emergency
cash through the Federal Reserve's discount window; and (3) access for banks to
the Federal Reserve's payment system").
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are associated with commercial concerns, one question is vhether
that deposit safety net gets spread too wide, leading to greater
public liability.
We have found in Europe that this is the case. The French

taxpayers and the Spanish taxpayers have forked out billions of
francs and pesetas, respectively.'
Arguably, it is one of the
principal problems in the Japanese economy. In my view, there is
no economic case whatsoever for applying the economies of scale
argument to merging commerce and banking, in most instances,
and there is certainly no national interest in doing so. I stress this
point for a number of reasons. One, because the U.S. Treasury

initially strongly pushed for new legislation.' as did other powerful
interests in the American economy' and some very important
members of Congress?
The Federal Reserve itself originally

supported a modest basket approach (the basket approach being
the authorization of a commercial bank to have five or ten or
fifteen percent of its assets in commercial endeavors).n But upon
28. See Banesto Fiasco, ECONOMusT, Jan. 8,1994, at 19 (reporting on the
collapse of Spain's fourth-largest bank and the subsequent intervention of the
Spanish government with funds to prevent the collapse of said bank); see also
CreditLyonnais: Humbled,ECONOMIsT, Mar. 26,1994, at 96 (reporting on Credit
Lyonnais's massive losses and subsequent bailout by the French government,
again to prevent the collapse of said bank).
29. See, e.g., Mark Tran, American Notebook: Ne' Life is Breathed into
Banking Reform, GUARDIAN (London), May 13,1991 (discussing the "ambitious
elements of the Treasury plan that w;ould allow bank affiliates to enter the
securities and insurance business[,] ...limit the coverage of the deposit insurance

system and allow commercial companies to own banks").
30. See eg., FinancialServices ModernizationAct: Hearingbefore die House
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of John B.
McCoy, President and Chief Executive Officer of Banc One Corp.) (stating that
"[Banc One officials] are confident that the proposals that Congress has
considered to mix banking and commerce could be safely and soundly executed
by this Nation's financial services and companies and commercial firms").
3L See Jayne Levin, Banking Reform Jello; Structural Changes This Year
Appear Unlikely, 1991 INv. DEALERS' DIG., Mar. 4, 1991 ('The measures by
[former member of the House Banking Committee United States Representative
(Democrat-Georgia) Doug] Barnard and [former member of the House Banking
Committee Unites States Representative (Republican-Ohio) Chalmers] Wylie
seek to encourage outside sources of capital to strengthen commercial banks.").
32. See, eg., Hearing of the Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit
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review of even that modest plan, it became evident that we would
no longer have an independent financial sector.
I stress this one point very strongly, that if you passed the
authorization for commerce and banking to be merged, there
would be no independent major financial institution in the United
States. That is, within months, Citigroup would be taken over by
AOL/Time Warner, General Electric, or perhaps Microsoft. For
example, if you look at the valuations at a market level of the new
kinds of companies, it is impressive. Only one of our financial
Virtually every financial
companies is in the top twenty."
institution would be a major takeover target. Those that had
advocated merging commerce and banking did so thinking that
banks would be the acquirers. Actually, they would likely become
the acquired.
It is my own personal sense that if you ask what is different in
the American economy from thirty or forty years ago - and there
are hundreds.
One of the differences that can be pointed out - is that we
have developed a new capacity, symbolized by New York in some
ways, to leverage capital and come to control institutions of one
kind or another through such leverage. But there is a great
difference between the ability to leverage capital and do mergers
and acquisitions on the one hand, and the ability to manage
companies on the other. I will tell you that the idea that America
would be better off taking x-number of companies from the New
York Stock Exchange and shrinking it ten-fold is not clear-cut to
me and is one about which we should be very concerned.
I stress this whole issue because this commerce-and-banking
circumstance can spring up without warning unless we are
extraordinarily vigilant. However, I believe that the "keiretsuSubcommittee of the House of Representatives Banking and Finance Committee,
FED.NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 13, 1997 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (testifying that
"[plerhaps those organizations that either have or established [sic] well
capitalized and well managed bank subsidiaries should be permitted a small
basket of non-financial assets").

33. See Shawn Tully, America's Wealth Creators,FoRTUNE, Nov. 22, 1999, at
275 (providing the market and economic value assets list of all major companies
for the year 1999).
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sization" 4 of our economy, the concentration of ownership, is not
the American way. You will find political, as well as economic,
backlash to such a principle, which I think is more rooted in hubris
than it is in the national interest.
Finally, a note about regulation and process itself. Part of the
legislation is simply about regulation." One of the great surprises
in the development of the statute was that, just as there are
rivalries which are well understood between industries and
between big and the small companies, there ended up being
significant rivalries concerning regulation. The private sector from
time to time is hallmarked by maximization of profit motives, while
the public sector sometimes by maximization of power. So we had
a "battle royale," for example, between the Treasury Department
and the Federal Reserve." This was partially reflected in the
commerce and bandng area.
It was my view - and I sometimes do not have a close-up view
of some circumstances - that the Treasury's position was to vest
more authority in the Treasury Department itself. At the same
time, however, if you mixed commerce and banldng, it would have
put the Treasury at the forefront in American society for review of
a huge amount of the American industrial base. This would have
been very difficult in a governmental sense and would have
resulted in a very politicized circumstance. For example, the
Treasury would become the focal point for fund-raising in
American politics. I think this would have been a major mistake,
and a particularly advantageous one for incumbent
administrations.
34. See Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental
European View, 16 B.U. INT'L LJ. 331, 410 (1993) (defining keiretsu as "the
Japanese system of cross-shareholding between related corporations, both
vertically and horizontally, with a core bank that advances relationships batveen
the members").
35. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L
No. 106-102, §§ 201-241,113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12
and 15 U.S.C.) (regulating broker-dealers and bank holding companies).
36. Stephen Labaton, Deal on Bank Bill Was Helped Along by Midnight
Talks, N.Y. Tn=Es, Oct. 24, 1990, at Al (noting that one obstacle to the passage
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley "was a turf battle between the Treasury [Department]
and the Fed[eral Reserve]).
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The compromise that was worked out in the end was
It was a compromise that was not necessarily
unexpected.
appreciated by the Comptroller's Office," which is a division of the
Department of Treasury, because the Federal Reserve got more or
less independent protection. The balance though is one of good,
solid competition where banks can choose between being regulated
The Treasury,
by the Federal Reserve or the Comptroller.'
however, got a somewhat greater political role, which I thought
was very appropriate at the Secretary level. So there was a little bit
of rivalry, not only between branches of government, but within
one institution of government. That is, rivalry between the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller's Office, which is a
division of the Treasury itself. The final product puts the Secretary
of the Treasury as a co-equal with the Chairman of the Federal
This puts the
Reserve in certain rule-making situations.39
constitutional role of the Executive Branch in play in, I think, an
appropriate way, but it also protects the Federal Reserve itself as a
regulator.
On the American political system, the way I look at it is that
our country has never led the world more than it does today. We
are the leaders in almost every area - from the arts to science to
business organization. In politics, we are the great exception in
terms of the quality of individuals serving in government. I think
there are problems at virtually every level of government in terms
On the other hand, our political process is
of excellence.
extraordinary. That is, the American political system is so strong
37. Comptroller of the Currency. See http://www.occ.treas.gov (last visited
October 23, 2000).
3& See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, § 721, 113 Stat. 1338; see also Weide and Kini, supranote 27, at 246
(explaining that there could be a problem with the division of authority because
the "division of authority [between the Federal Reserve Board and the
Department of Treasury regulators of the United States] allows banking firms to
choose to structure their operations so that they fall within the purview of the
regulator that the organization believes may be the most accommodating"
thereby possibly circumventing the goals of Congress).

39. See id §103(a) (requiring notification and consultation, among other
things, between the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury of
the United States concerning "determination[s] of whether an activity is financial
in nature or incidental to a financial activity").
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that average people can do reasonably well within its parameters.
Therefore, "process" in many ways is our most important political
product.
As Chairman of the Conference Committee on this
legislation, I insisted that we adopt a bipartisan and biinstitutional approach, as it would not have done much good to
have a partisan product that would have been vetoed or a radical
product that subsequent Congresses would have reformed. It was
also extraordinarily important, at all stages in the process, to keep
the public interest in mind. Issues of antitrust, privacy and
consumer convenience, not institutional advantage, were the basic
guideposts.
Making laws is, in the end, a confluence of three factors:
substance, timing, and chemistry. The stars came into alignment
for reform last year, but there should be little doubt that there is no
inevitability to legislation of this kind. Differences within and
between industries, rivalries within and between branches of
government, House/Senate philosophical chasms, and a lack of
goodwill in the American political process or system could all have
derailed reform efforts at any point. The fact that the glue held
together was rather remarkable. We now have a new dawn in
financial services. I look forward to seeing how well our economy
functions because of it.
Thank you very much.

40. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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